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THE BOOK 
We know that you are in the process of finishing your monograph. Let us then 
begin with the question: why “Mind the Body”?  
While more and more people make every possible use of the notion of embodiment 
within the growing Embodied Cognition research program, the body itself remains an 
object rarely investigated explicitly. The embodied approach claims to return the mind 
to the body. In this book, my objective is to return the body to the mind. The aim of my 
book is to develop a naturalistic approach to bodily self-awareness and its underlying 
body representations, combining philosophical analysis with recent experimental re-
sults from cognitive neuroscience, neuropsychology, and psychiatry. 
To continue the subject of your new book: your research interests centre around 
body awareness and the cognition of others. Will the book bring a synthesis of 
these  two  domains  (e.g.  a  continuation of  what  you  cooperated  on  with Alvin 
Goldman)?  
Most of the book is dedicated to self-awareness, and, more particularly, to the sense of 
body ownership (i.e. the awareness of the body as one’s own). In order to do so, I need 
to single out representations of the body that are self-specific for them to be suscepti-
ble to ground body ownership. However, recent evidence from the mirroring litera-
ture as well as mirror-tactile synaesthesia seems to indicate that some body represen-
tations at least are shared between self and others. In Chapter 5 of the body, I thus 
analyse to what extent body representations can be shared and their implication for 
the theory of ownership that I defend.  
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Although, as we have mentioned, your research centers around two notions, is 
there any subject your haven’t published about yet, but which intrigues you and 
which you are planning to undertake? 
I am more and more interested in the wide range of bodily sensations beyond touch 
and proprioception, and, in particular, in pain and in interoception. Bodily sensations 
have been exploited in the philosophical literature as paradigmatic examples of qua-
lia, thus neglecting their specificity. They remain rarely, if ever, analysed for their own 
sake. Little is known about how these sensations fit into the architecture of mind. Col-
lectively, they resist analysis as either perceptual or affective states. The variety of 
bodily sensations is so wide that they may seem to form a mongrel category. What 
qualifies such a variety of experiences as bodily sensations? What do they have in 
common? Can one provide a unified account of bodily sensations despite their dissimi-
larities? I would like to work on these questions in the future once the book is done. 
 
picture source: F. de Vignemont's archives 
THE BODY 
The body, or, more precisely, bodily awareness and bodily self-knowledge, fre-
quently appear in your work in the spirit of Evans’ works, as do references to 
Frege. Where does your interest in these authors stem from? And as concerns the 
latter of these authors, do you think that the categories present in Frege’s re-
search can be successfully used in studies on the sense of ownership, or the re-
presentations of the body? 
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I was philosophically brought up with Evans, so to speak. The Jean-Nicod Institute, 
where I did my PhD, is strongly influenced by the Fregean tradition, and by Evans. I 
was actually surprised the first time I visited another philosophy department in the 
States that Evans was not the key reference there. There are many aspects of Evans’ 
theory that I appreciate. For instance, his paper on Molyneux’s problem is the best I’ve 
read on the topic. Another example is his treatment of the notion of immunity to error 
through misidentification. He was the first to acknowledge the importance of the ways 
of gaining self-information, and, in particular, of body senses.  
 
In  your  aforementioned  research  there  appear  references  to  Gibson’s  concep-
tion. What do you think about his notion of a hand as a subjective object? 
Gibson is, of course, very important if one wants to work on topics such as the self, 
action and the body. But I prefer to avoid slogans like “subjective object,” because you 
can put everything and nothing behind. I do believe that the hand has a special status 
in comparison to other parts of the body: we often see our hands, most of our actions 
are performed by them and their tactile sensitivity is very high. They are thus especial-
ly  interesting.  What  is  problematic,  however,  is  that  most  experiments  on  bodily 
awareness investigate only the representation of the hand and it is not obvious that 
we can always generalize results on the hand to the other body parts, let alone to the 
body as a whole.  
 
In your work you try to retain and defend the division into body scheme and body 
image, although you formulate a more functional definition thereof (than, for 
instance, Gallagher). Do you reject the existence of three distinct kinds of body 
representations  (entailing  structural  representation  of  the  body)  only  on  eco-
nomic grounds? On the other hand, are you perhaps planning (or working on) a 
continuation  of  your  research  from  “The  weight  of  representing  the  body…”, 
which was a certain alternative for the divisions present in literature of the sub-
ject? 
The more I work on the notions of body schema and body image, the less I want to 
keep the terminology. There is too much confusion and too little evidence in favour of 
the dual distinction. Yet, I do not think that the threefold distinction suffices to account 
for the complexity of the field. I now make two orthogonal distinctions which I call 
‘cold’ and ‘hot’ body representations and long-term and short-term body representa-
tions. The latter distinction is quite standard and comes from O’Shaughnessy. For the 
former distinction, I use Ruth Millikan’s theory about pushmipulliu representations. 
Cold body representations are purely descriptive. They represent various types of bo-
dily properties, as they can be experienced in bodily awareness. Hot body representa-
tions are both descriptive and directive. They have two directions of fit, world-to-mind 
and mind-to-world. They represent bodily affordances for action. Now, one can ask 
how many cold and hot body representations there are. But I think that the Bayesian 
approach makes this question meaningless. AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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Sometimes in your works there appears the idea of body space: maybe this con-
cept would be more satisfying than earlier distinctions, especially if we remem-
ber how important a role space took e.g. in Kant’s philosophy (being aware of the 
existing differences between these two, obviously)?  
Starting from the intuition that the body where I feel bodily sensations is the body that 
I experience as mine, I analyse in the book how the mind builds up representations of 
bodily space: a theory of embodiment requires a theory of spatial ascription of bodily 
experiences. Spatial ascription of bodily experiences, however, displays puzzling fea-
tures, which do not seem to fit with what we know of spatiality. It becomes then ques-
tionable whether bodily sensations themselves are intrinsically spatial, as it has been 
suggested by the Local sign theory in the 19
th century. If the Local sign theory were 
true, then one would expect to experience floating sensations with no spatial ascrip-
tion, and exosomesthesia, that is, sensations experienced beyond the felt boundaries of 
one’s body. But there are no such things (for more details, see the chapter The mark of 
touch, co-written with Olivier Massin for the Oxford Handbook of philosophy of percep-
tion). I also criticize the sensorimotor approach to bodily experiences, showing that it 
faces a dilemma. As I argue in my Mosquito paper, if the enactive account is cast in 
terms of spatial know-how (how to reach and move the body part that is touched), 
then it is false, because spatial know-how is separable from bodily experiences. If the 
enactive account is not cast in terms of spatial know-how, then it is unclear what type 
of sensorimotor expectations could provide the spatial content of any kind of tactile 
experiences, including instantaneous passive touch. Rather, what I defend is what I 
call the Body Map theory, partly inspired by O’Shaughnessy’s theory. In my view, so-
matosensory information does not suffice to account for the spatial content of bodily 
experiences. It needs to be structured by what I call the body map, that is, the repre-
sentation of the spatial configuration of the body. Furthermore, I argue that the body 
map is multimodal, that it is dynamic, and that it can be either purely descriptive or 
both descriptive and directive.  
 
You  devote  little  attention  to  the  idea  of  the  pre-reflexiveness  of  bodily  con-
sciousness. Asking in the spirit of one of Adrian Alsmith’s papers, do you think 
there exists such a thing as pre-reflexive consciousness? Is it something more 
than marginal consciousness (referring to your own work)? 
I think this may be more a terminological debate than a real disagreement. The notion 
of pre-reflexive consciousness comes from the phenomenological tradition. But it is 
not clear to me what exactly is meant by pre-reflexivity, and this is why I avoid it. Is it 
merely a matter of attention or introspection? But then I agree that we do not attend to 
most of our bodily experiences. Or is it a matter of conceptualization? But then I agree 
that bodily experiences have non-conceptual content. Or is it something else, but then 
what?  
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This is our last question regarding the subject of the body: from the studies on 
the rubber hand illusion there appears to emerge a rather paradoxical picture of 
our embodiment, as it seems that it is sight which plays a key role in our feeling 
of  being  corporeal,  especially  in  the  context of  the  recently  published  results 
showing the lack of RHI in visually impaired people. What are your thoughts on 
this issue? 
I was actually very happy when I found out about this recent study by Henrik Ehrsson 
with blind people. It is not so often when experimental data confirm your theories… I 
strongly believe that vision plays an important role for bodily awareness. This is well 
accepted for action, why not for the body? For too long, philosophers have emphasized 
the importance of proprioception. However, recent literature about multisensory inte-
raction  shows  that  bodily  experiences are  not  exclusively based  on  somatosensory 
information. They are rather multimodal, and even constitutively so, as I defend in a 
paper currently under revision. I argue that blind people experience their body diffe-
rently that sighted people, as this is well illustrated by this study. I do not see why this 
raises difficulty for the problem of ownership. Actually in a chapter for a collected 
volume on immunity to error through misidentification edited by Recanati and Pross-
er, I argue that vision can ground bodily judgments that are immune to error in some 
circumstances and even when it does not, multimodality is not an obstacle for immun-
ity.  
 
Could you comment on the opinion below? 
Frederique de Vignemont recently co-authored an article with Alvin Gold-
man  on  embodied  accounts  of  social  cognition  in  the  journal  Trends  in 
Cognitive Sciences. What they called embodiment was anything but embo-
diment. (…) So their question comes to this: how does a body, without a 
brain, isolated from its environment (including the social environment), 
and unable to perceive the bodily behaviors of others, discover the mental 
states of others? Their answer, what they call the best (or ‘most promis-
ing’) candidate for an embodied account, paradoxically, is that social cog-
nition depends on body representations in the brain – paradoxically, be-
cause they ruled out appeal to the brain in any true embodied account. In 
effect, what they call the best candidate for an embodied account is an ac-
count that excludes any contribution from the body. Obviously, if this is 
considered an embodied account, there is a problem.
49 
Most evidence in favour of the so-called embodied approach to social cognition comes 
from the discovery of mirror systems, and nobody can deny that they are in the brain. 
One can then say that Gallese and all the others are wrong in taking these results into 
account to defend an embodied view. Or one can try to determine the peculiarities of 
this specific brain activity in comparison with other brain processes. That’s what we 
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did with Alvin by proposing the notion of bodily code or format. It is interesting to 
note that Gallese and Sinigaglia have taken over this notion in their own TICS paper. 
You could then say that they do not defend an embodied account of social cognition. 
But if not them, who does? 
 
OTHER MINDS 
The other large subject in your work are other minds. Although you do not speci-
fy it this way, if your works can be considered to conceptualize embodied cogni-
tion, would that be embodied cognition of other minds? 
I am interested in embodied cognition, but I would not qualify myself as an embodied 
theorist. For instance, my view on empathy is not really embodied. With Tania Singer 
and with Pierre Jacob, we stress the importance of cognitive appraisal, as shown by 
modulation of the activity of the pain network by many factors, some of them being 
high-level. In addition, there is a variety of questions about social cognition I am inter-
ested in beyond the implications of the discovery of mirror systems. For instance, I 
recently co-wrote a paper with Hugo Mercier on egocentric and altercentric biases, 
and their consequences for the Simulation approach. Recent evidence by Kovacs and 
by Samson indicates that we can be influenced by what we believe other people be-
lieve although it is pointless or even detrimental. Since the egocentric bias is taken as 
evidence in favour of the Simulation approach, we analysed whether the altercentric 
bias was a counterargument against the Simulation theory.  
 
On the other hand, there exist numerous indications towards the social nature of 
bodily  representations  themselves  (a  tradition  dating  back  at  least  to  Marcel 
Mauss’s works). Do you think that knowledge about one’s own body can be ex-
plained without referencing social factors? 
Can Robinson Crusoe move on his desert island? Obviously, yes. And to do so, he needs 
knowledge about his body. One may reply that he spent all his childhood surrounded 
by people. Maybe then other people would be important for the acquisition of body 
representations. But again, if we look at animals that are not social, it is hardly contro-
versial to claim that they have a kind of representation of their body that they use for 
action. Social factors can influence body knowledge, but I do not think that they con-
stitute a necessary condition. What is more interesting is whether they are necessary 
for the feeling of ownership. In other words, if you are not aware that there are other 
bodies, do you feel your body as your own?  
 
While we are going to return to enactivist concepts, could you share with us your 
opinion regarding enactivist, direct concepts of cognition of other minds? 
If you mean the theory of direct perception as defended by Zahavi, then I have diffi-
culties in understanding it both for conceptual and empirical reasons. It seems some-
times that it falls into behaviorism, as if mental states exclusively consisted in public Interview with F. de Vignemont 
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behaviours that can be perceived. It is also difficult to accommodate with the evidence 
of modulation in empathy, which shows that there is nothing direct. And if by direct, 
they merely mean the absence of conscious inferences, then it becomes hard to see 
their disagreement with other theories. Advocates of theory theory and simulation 
theory have never assumed that mindreading processes are conscious.  
  
The discussion regarding the nature of mechanisms underlying mindreading has 
for a long time been structured by the famous "theory theory/simulation theory" 
distinction. Some currently argue that it is high time we abandoned this opposi-
tion as no longer useful and looked for completely new concepts and theories 
that could explain the ability to attribute mental states to others (perhaps ones 
directly inspired by neuroscience rather than philosophy). Would you agree with 
this assessment, or do you think that theory theory or simulation theory (or some 
combination thereof) could still prove useful? If the latter is true, then which of 
those theories do you think is on point, or at least closer to the truth? If the for-
mer is true, then what do you think a new, alternative explanation of mindread-
ing might look like? 
It is true that several hybrid views have been proposed. As argued by Goldman (2006), 
simulation and theorizing need not be in competition. Rather, they may cooperate (if 
for instance, a theory is used to select the pretend inputs). Furthermore, some instan-
tiations of mindreading may result from simulation only, whereas others may result 
from theorizing only. With the new hybrid views emerges what we might call the mul-
tiple routes hypothesis. On this view, there is more than one route leading to min-
dreading. The multiple routes hypothesis may then be in a position to account for re-
cent results both in neuroscience with the discovery of mirror systems and in deve-
lopmental psychology with the new implicit versions of the false-belief task, which are 
successfully passed by infants as young as 13-month old. The multiple routes hypothe-
sis can be declined in many ways: low-level and high-level simulation (Goldman 2006), 
implicit and explicit mindreading (Frith & Frith 2008), minimal and full-blown theory 
of mind (Apperly & Butterfill 2012), system 1 and system 2 (Evans 2008), and so forth. 
But these distinctions raise a number of questions. In particular, along what dimen-
sion(s)  should  mindreading  processes  be  distinguished?  Their  automaticity?  Their 
availability to consciousness? Their efficiency? Their flexibility? The conceptual appa-
ratus they require? Or the types of mental states they target? 
 
Pierre Jacob - a philosopher with whom you have cooperated - proposed several 
years ago that neural structures commonly dubbed "mirror systems" may in fact 
underlie conceptual representations of certain mental states. From this point of 
view, structures that are responsible for experiencing some mental states (e.g. 
disgust)  are  also  used  to  represent those  states  conceptually.  This  proposition 
appears close to neo-empirical approaches to the issue of encoding notions in the 
brain. What do you think of such an idea? Do you see any empirical basis that 
might support it? Do you see it as a potentially attractive way of "embodying" AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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social cognition? Would you consider the neo-empirical approach to notions as 
such (not necessarily mental notions) close to your research?  
Pierre Jacob was my master and my PhD superviser, so we’ve had many discussions 
on mirror systems together. I think he has done a great job in inviting neuroscientists 
to be more careful with the use of the notion of mirroring. According to Evans’ prin-
ciple of generality, I master the concept ‘to grasp’ if I am able to use it to represent 
both that I grasp a peanut/a glass of water and that John grasps a peanut/a glass of 
water (x grasps y). Such definition of concepts meets the requirement of mirror sys-
tems. And indeed, mirror systems have been said to encode a ‘‘motor vocabulary’’ 
shared between self and others (Rizzolatti et al. 1988). However, we should not neglect 
also the specificity of mirror systems, namely, the fact that they are pragmatic repre-
sentations, to borrow Jeannerod’s terms. They represent action from the first-person 
point of view of the agent in interaction with the world. This is well illustrated by Cal-
vo-Merino and coll. (2006)’s study on ballet dancers: dancers have visual familiarity 
for all the visually presented movements, but only motor familiarity for movements of 
their own gender. Mirror activity was found only in the latter case. I would like also to 
add that with Pierre, we both agree that it is misleading to qualify as mirroring shared 
brain activity in the domains of emotion and bodily sensation. We believe that it de-
serves a different account. For instance, in a joint paper on empathy for pain, we have 
defended the view that shared brain activity in the pain network should be unders-
tood in terms of enactment imagination.  
 
INTERDISCIPLINARITY 
It is very interesting to us (primarily as philosophers) how you manage to con-
nect your philosophical works with those strictly experimental? Is it difficult, or 
more of a natural task? How do you see the role of the philosopher in experimen-
tal work? 
Bringing together different approaches is never easy and it is especially hard to find a 
good balance between theoretical discussions and experimental results. In particular, 
one danger is to believe that empirical data provide the answers to all the philosophi-
cal problems.  Empirical  data provide  only  partial  or  indirect answers  to  questions 
more fully expressed in a philosophical context. Philosophical theories and conceptual 
tools are thus needed for the perspicuous interpretation of empirical data and their 
systematization. Another danger is to use selectively empirical evidence, taking what 
confirms the view that one wants to defend, and leaving out the other results that do 
not fit so well. For example, in the last ten years, research in cognitive science has 
yielded a vast array of exciting discoveries and provocative hypotheses about bodily 
awareness. It is only if one takes the time to study systematically the very rich and 
complex recent empirical literature that one can offer a full-fleshed theory of bodily 
awareness.  I  was  lucky  enough  to  be  trained  both  in  philosophy  and  in  cognitive 
science. In particular, I learnt a lot during my post-doc with Pr. Patrick Haggard, dur-
ing which I actually designed and ran experiments. Since then, I’ve been able to colla-
borate with several psychologists, and my role has been limited to design experiments Interview with F. de Vignemont 
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and discuss results. I think that philosophers can be helpful at both stages. But even 
without directly collaborating with psychologists, I think that the interaction between 
the experimental and the philosophical perspectives is essential. Through confronta-
tion with empirical findings, one can shed new light on long-standing conceptual is-
sues, hone new conceptual frameworks, and explore and resolve a new range of puz-
zles revealed by cognitive science. 
 
You have cooperated with many leading scholars, both scientists (Marc Jeanne-
rod,  Uta  Frith, Patrick  Haggard,  Tania  Singer)  and  philosophers (Pierre  Jacob, 
Alvin Goldman). Which of these collaborations do you find most memorable? 
That’s a tricky question. I’ve been very lucky through my research career, I’ve had the 
opportunity to meet amazing people both at the professional level and at the personal 
level. I have also been able recently to collaborate with great pleasure with Alessandro 
Farnè,  Marjolein  Kammers, Adrian Alsmith,  Olivier  Massin and  Hugo  Mercier.  I’ve 
learnt a lot with all the people I have worked with. But more than collaborators, they 
are friends with whom I share a lot more than just papers. 
 
When you connect philosophical and experimental works, don’t you feel as if you 
were “living on no man’s land,” between science and philosophy? 
Or on everybody’s land I hope, where we can all meet and discuss.  
 
To close this subject – you practise interdisciplinarity. Do you have a theoretical 
vision of what this interdisciplinarity entails? 
In all my work, I defend a naturalist approach to the mind. By definition, this involves 
interdisciplinarity. I do not believe that one can achieve a real understanding of the 
mind  without  looking at  results coming  from cognitive  science.  My  work  is  at the 
meeting point between a bottom up approach, based on the analysis of empirical evi-
dence, and a top down approach, based on conceptual analysis. Those two approaches 
are complementary and both necessary.  
 
ENACTIVISM 
It seems that over the course of its development enactivism has become more 
differentiated rather than more defined. It can be treated as a certain frame of 
conceptualization  or  a  research  platform,  allowing  to  coordinate  divergent 
views. How would you respond to the objection that in the otherwise excellent “A 
mosquito bite…” you have somewhat concocted the enanctivist perspective with 
which you argue? According to one group, you have dealt with the enactivist ap-
proach to bodily experiences; according to another, you help to make them more 
precise. AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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It may be because I share the enactivist intuition that action must play a role in self-
awareness that I feel so frustrated when I cannot find a clear articulation of what this 
role is. It is very difficult to criticize the enactivist view because its proponents can 
always say that it is not exactly what they meant. But I presented the Mosquito paper 
in front of Alva Noë and Kevin O’Regan, and they took the objections that I offered 
seriously.  That’s  a beginning.  Furthermore,  with  Adrian Alsmith,  we have recently 
published a special issue on embodied cognition and body representation in the Re-
view of Philosophy and Psychology. Our aim was to clarify the field and to bring to-
gether people that do not agree. For instance, there is a discussion between Ned Block 
and Kevin O’Regan and another between Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Povinelli. They 
do not agree in the end, but, at least, the nature and the extent of their disagreement is 
clearer. 
 
How would you react to an opinion like this: The article “Habeas Corpus…” pro-
vides, among others, reasons for enactive grounding for a sense of self, own body, 
ownership of one’s own body in action? Much like e.g. Dana Ballard, never men-
tioning enactivism or embodiment in his studies, which are described in a rather 
computational manner, he arrives at the conclusion You see what you need, unin-
tentionally supporting enactivism with his research.  
I am aware of this apparent paradox in my theory. Since the Habeas Corpus paper, I 
have somehow refined my view. In particular, if one wants to give a theory of body 
ownership, one needs to account for the following puzzles: why do we feel ownership 
for a rubber hand although action is immune to the Rubber Hand Illusion? And why 
do we feel no ownership for tools although we can feel sensations there? I still want to 
keep the view that I defend in the Habeas Corpus article: I feel ownership towards a 
body part that is represented in a specific type of representation of the bodily space 
for action. But more work is needed to determine the content of this representation. 
And we need finer-grained concepts that the body schema.  
 
You write that "action is immune to the Rubber Hand Illusion", but Zopf et al. 
show something different, that action is affected. Maybe the issue is that (1) we 
look at the wrong 'part' of action; (2) in other research on RHI and action, one's 
own body is the goal of action, but in Zopf et al. there are nonbodily goals (as in 
one of Kammers at al.'s papers, with similar results as in Zopf's paper), maybe 
the goal of action makes a difference?). 
I haven't read this new study yet (but it's on my reading list...). However, there is al-
ready  a  reply  based  on  another  study  by  Marjolein  Kammers  and  her  colleagues 
(2010). They found that in some circumstances action could be sensitive to the RHI. In 
this experiment, the participant’s hand and the rubber hand were shaped as if they 
were ready to grasp an object, with congruent or incongruent width of grip aperture. 
Both the index fingers and the thumbs of the real hand and of the rubber hand were 
stroked. After the stroking phase, participants were asked to mimic the perceived grip 
aperture using their non-stimulated hand or to grasp an object with their stimulated Interview with F. de Vignemont 
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hand. This time, it was found that both the perceptual and the motor responses were 
sensitive to the illusion. The representation of the hand configuration did not seem to 
differ between action and perception. One can find explanations for the differences 
between the two RHI studies. For example, one appeals to local stimulation of the in-
dex finger, whereas the other appeals to a more holistic stimulation of both index fin-
ger and thumb. Moreover, one is exclusively about the body, whereas the other is 
about the relation between the body and an external object. But all these possible ex-
planations merely show that when it comes to empirically dissociating different types 
of body representations, there are many factors that may interfere. This is one reason 
among others why I think we should stop counting body representations.  
 
What is your attitude towards such concepts as situated and dispersed cognition, 
and thus – to the work of such scholars as Edwin Hutchins or David Kirsh? We are 
asking here about your approach to studying relations between individuals and 
their environment (including inanimate environment): can they to any degree 
have importance for your perspective? 
I haven’t really worked on that. The only way I take into account the environment in 
my theory is in terms of peripersonal space, which I think, is fascinating. But that’s far 
from the issues raised by situated cognition. 
 
OTHER ISSUES 
Would you agree with J. Kevin O'Regan on the subject of benefits that can be 
drawn for the knowledge of cognition and consciousness from the study of aes-
thetic experience? This scholar – as he has put it – expresses doubts whether 
studying one mysterious thing can distinctly help in understanding another. 
I am really not an expert there. I agree with Kevin that for now we know little about 
aesthetic experience. But that’s precisely why we need to study it. 
Very frequently we find in your work quotations from literature, such as from 
Gogol’s Nose or Edmond About’s book. Is literature your second passion, after 
philosophy? If not, then what is? 
Yes, indeed. You might even say that it is my first passion. Some people are addicted to 
tobacco or coffee. My addiction has always been literature, since I was a child. And 
you should see me when I have no novel left at home, I can be in a very bad mood. 
Any suggestion, by the way, about Polish authors I should read?...  
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